In addition to calling for a new U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction treaty, U.S. President Barack Obama said in Prague in April 2009 that he wanted “to put an end to Cold War thinking” and pledged to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same.”
The Obama administration’s new Nuclear Posture Review, released last week, does not change U.S. policy as much as it should or could have, but the 72-page document represents an important shift in U.S. nuclear thinking and practice.
The document narrows the circumstances under which the United States might use nuclear weapons, formally establishes some common-sense constraints on U.S. nuclear modernization, and it does so in ways that should help reduce the salience of nuclear weapons, help curb proliferation and open the way for further nuclear arms cuts.
Unlike previous nuclear doctrines in 2001 and 1994, this version finally recognizes the fact that deploying more than 2,000 strategic nuclear weapons intended to deter nuclear attacks, defend U.S. forces or allies against massive conventional attack and counter chemical and biological threats is neither appropriate nor necessary for security and stability in the 21st century. Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review identifies nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism as “our most urgent priorities” — not a large-scale attack from Russia, which, as the review states explicitly, “is no longer an adversary.”
The doctrine also acknowledges that “by reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons … we can put ourselves in a much better position to persuade our NPT [nuclear nonproliferation] partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the nonproliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”
The document emphasizes that the “fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack” on the United States and its allies and that the “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons is to deter their use. It also clarifies that the United States pledges not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are in compliance with? the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, even in the unlikely event that one of those states attack with chemical or biological weapons.
This revised negative security assurance is very useful in that it underscores the security benefits of adhering to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the value of working to strengthen and update the treaty. U.S. officials must be careful not to suggest — as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates did when he cited Iran and North Korea in his April 6 news conference — that it is any more likely that the United States will use nuclear weapons against states not covered by the assurance.
Unfortunately, the Nuclear Posture Review states that in the case of “states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations — there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW [chemical and biological weapons] attack.” As a result, the review states that the United States is not “at the present time” prepared to adopt a policy that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack.
Assigning U.S. nuclear weapons any role beyond “core nuclear deterrence” is both unnecessary and counterproductive. The United States, as well as Russia, should adopt a “sole purpose” policy now rather than later. Reserving the option to use nuclear force in non-nuclear situations provides little or no deterrent value at a high cost. It undermines the credibility of conventional deterrence, complicates our nonproliferation diplomacy and can be used by other countries to justify the pursuit or improvement of nuclear weapons.
In stark contrast to former U.S. President George W. Bush’s Nuclear Posture Review in 2001, Obama’s review supports U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it rules out the development of “new nuclear warheads” and “will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.” Technically, new warheads and renewed nuclear testing are not needed to maintain the reliability of the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile given the success of ongoing U.S. warhead life-extension programs.
But the nuclear doctrine allows a loophole. It could allow for the replacement of certain nuclear components at some point in the future if they are based on previously tested designs and are approved by the president. Nonetheless, Obama’s policy of “no new nuclear weapons” is a step forward, and it should be emulated by other nuclear states to further reduce nuclear competition.
Another significant feature is the stated goal to “pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues on strategic stability with both Russia and China, which are aimed at fostering more stable, resilient and transparent strategic relationships.” Coupled with Obama’s April 8 call for continued talks between Moscow and Washington on further reductions involving all warheads — including deployed and nondeployed, strategic and nonstrategic — it is clear that the United States wants to move beyond New START in the months and years ahead.
Unfortunately, the review doesn’t spell out how much further the Obama administration is prepared to reduce the U.S. arsenal. It calls for a “follow-on analysis of the goals for future arms reductions below the levels expected in New START,” noting that “Russia’s nuclear forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces.”
Given that the “fundamental role” of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons is to deter their use by the other and given that China has no more than 300 nuclear weapons, both should reduce their arsenals to 500 or fewer survivable strategic warheads each so long as other nuclear-armed states do not increase their arsenals. The United States and Russia must also make good on their goal of cooperating on regional missile defense systems and avoiding unilateral strategic missile defense deployments that could negatively affect offensive strategic capabilities.
While Obama’s nuclear review calls for retiring nuclear-equipped, sea-launched cruise missiles, it is neutral on whether the United States will maintain the 200 gravity bombs at NATO bases in five European countries pending a formal decision by NATO by November. These weapons should be retired since they serve no practical military role in defending NATO members and are an impediment to talks with Russia on reducing its larger stockpile of tactical nuclear bombs.
In the end, Obama’s new nuclear policy reduces the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in the country’s security strategy and moves the United States and Russia toward a more stable strategic relationship with each side having lower levels of nuclear arms. But to fulfill the promise of Obama’s Prague vision of a world without nuclear weapons, U.S. and Russian leaders must still do more. Above all, they must both recognize that nuclear weapons are more of a threat than a useful military asset in the 21st century.
Daryl G. Kimball is executive director of the nongovernmental Arms Control Association in Washington.
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