Very Little Collective Security

The Collective Security Treaty Organization is clearly dying. From the moment of its inception in 2002, it was obvious that the CSTO was a pseudo defense alliance that had little chance of becoming “Russia’s NATO” — even in miniature.

The conflict in Kyrgyzstan is a case in point. For two weeks the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks have been killing each other in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad. Russian officials emphatically demanded an end to the bloodshed but dropped the ball when Kyrgyz interim leader Roza Otunbayeva appealed to Moscow, the leader of the CSTO, for security assistance.

The excuse from the Kremlin and other CSTO member states for not intervening was that the alliance’s charter only allows for collective military operations in response to an external threat or attack — presumably from the United States, if it were to suddenly seize Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, for example.

But the recent Kyrgyz violence, of course, is strictly an “internal matter.” In other words, let Kyrgyz and Uzbek gangs kill each other and torch each other’s homes for as long as they want.

The main reason Moscow refused to intervene is that it has no battle-ready units at its disposal. Under pressure from the country’s generals, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov ultimately caved in and agreed to end the ambitious reform program of forming divisions made up of contract soldiers. Thus, the army is now comprised exclusively of draftees who serve only one year. Since they are drafted in two intervals per year, the most experienced draftees at any given time have served a maximum of only six months — clearly not enough time to execute any serious military or peacekeeping operation.

Compare this indifference to the Kremlin’s heightened interest in establishing military bases in Kyrgyzstan. Moscow even wanted to open a second base in Osh.

Also, compare Russia’s current indifference to its heightened interest in intervening in South Ossetia and Abhakzia in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Remember all of the histrionics about defeating the “crazed” Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and saving civilians from Georgian “genocide.” (Officially, the civilian death toll from the five-day war ranges from 162 to 228.) For some reason, the Kremlin is much less concerned when up to 2,000 of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are killed in interethnic violence.

The Kyrgyz conflict has shown that Russia’s imperial ambitions are as hollow as its claims to be a democracy. If the Kremlin wants to establish its “zone of privileged interests” in the former Soviet space, this means that it must play a strong leadership role when innocent people are being killed in riots and pogroms in the region.

At the same time, the leaders of the former Soviet republics are willing to play the role of “junior partners” and stroke the Kremlin’s ego to receive generous financial aid. After all, if fools can be found in Moscow who are willing to dole out money in exchange for an occasional kowtow, why not take full advantage of them? But as soon as there is a very serious crisis, such as the revolution and violence in Kyrgyzstan, the former Soviet republics understand perfectly well that they cannot count on Moscow to stabilize the conflict.

The conflict in Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated that Russia is incapable of being even a regional leader. Although the Kremlin is obsessed with U.S. interference in the region, their real concern should be that China will fill the vacuum and become the region’s leader. The Chinese are in a much better position to pick up the ball that the Kremlin has dropped in Central Asia.