Long Path to Europe?€™s Very Distant Unification

The Treaty of Lisbon, which went into effect on Dec. 1, is another chapter in the attempt to unify Europe. But the integration process started long before Lisbon or even the Treaty of Paris — the accord signed in 1951 by France, West Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries that created the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner to the European Union.

In the first century B.C., the majority of European nations were “integrated,” but only in the sense that they were subjects of the Roman Empire. After the Roman Empire collapsed, the Holy Roman Empire once again tried to unite most of Europe. In the beginning of the 19th century, Napoleon expressed his strong desire to turn Europe into a “friendly, civilized family” without borders or conflict. But roughly a century later, in 1914, Europe entered the most unfriendly, uncivilized and bloody conflict that it had ever seen. Nations had just recovered from the ruins of World War I when World War II turned out to be an even greater catastrophe.

The victors in that war swore not only to live in peace and harmony but to create a “United States of Europe.” A unified Europe again remained out of reach, however, as ideology divided the people of the continent into two opposing camps: the Western democratic bloc and the Soviet communist bloc. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the question immediately arose: Will the Western camp unravel now that it is without its enemy from the East?

Events of the past two decades demonstrate that the desire for European integration remains intact. This is furthered by a steadily increasing interdependence between states in all areas — from the economy and the environment to the fight against terrorism and organized crime. The process of integration has created benefits that nobody wants to reject, including transparent borders, a unified currency and new opportunities for employment and education.

Without a doubt, Russia has played an important role in shaping the political, economic and security landscape in the EU. Many in Europe who perceive Russia as growing stronger and having larger global ambitions see it as a potential political, economic and, in some cases, military threat that can only be countered collectively. The EU members that were once subjects of the Soviet bloc have the most cautious — if not hostile — attitude toward Moscow. They are afraid to coexist with their mighty Russian neighbor without protection from the West.

The Chinese threat has lately begun to loom on the horizon as well. The giant dragon from the East has underpriced European products on global markets and crushed whole sectors of Europe’s economy. What’s more, China’s military might is growing on the heels of its economic boom.

Although the United States is an ally of Europe, it is easier for the EU to deal with Washington as a unified body. For its part, Washington has more respect for the EU as a collective body than it has for any member nation separately. Moreover, when the United States finds itself in an economic crisis or commits some blunder on the world arena, it has a better chance of overcoming the consequences of those mistakes by maintaining close cooperation with Europe.

There are other factors in addition to those that now hinder European integration. The most obvious is the presence of powerful national institutions in the EU’s member states. Parliaments, judicial bodies, armed forces and secret services are fixated on asserting and preserving the sovereignty of their particular states. In addition, various nations cherish their own particular languages, cultures, religions and traditions. In short, these are all manifestations of the fierce nationalism that permeates practically every nation on the continent. During periods of crises, nationalism assumes its most extreme form, growing into a chauvinistic attitude that pushes national leaders into taking protectionist measures, isolating a state from the outside world and distancing itself from the ideals of the EU.

To make matters worse, European states continue to polemicize the memory of past conflicts and offenses. The French idolize Joan of Arc who fought the English, Napoleon who fought all of Europe and Charles de Gaulle who resisted the German invasion. The English, Spanish, Germans and Italians all have their own pantheon of heroes who, in some cases, have gained notoriety for their struggles against the French. It would be difficult to create a single European identity without so much complicated and contradictory historical baggage getting in the way. What’s more, the increasing immigrant population that includes Muslims, Buddhists, animists and other minorities makes a unified European identity even more complicated.

It is no simple task to find a common denominator among the current demands, interests and positions of Europeans. We run up against this conundrum almost daily. Europe’s capital cities hold differing opinions concerning the war in Iraq, the United States, Russia, the Middle East and on hundreds of other major issues. Old Europe has plenty of complaints concerning the new Europe — and vice versa.

There is an interesting movement circulating in many European capitals that promotes the idea that the major powers should be broken down into smaller units to promote the federalization of Europe. The most frequently cited example is Switzerland, with its small cantons that provide for true democracy and a successful federation. But this is a nonstarter for several reasons. First, no modern European state would voluntarily and submissively agree to its own dissolution. Second, even if they were to agree, the consequences would be disastrous. Regions and ethnic groups would begin divvying up borders, territories, resources, power stations, holy sanctuaries and so on. Carving up Europe in this matter would hardly be any more orderly or painless than the dissolution of Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union.

In the end, even while Europe continues to work toward greater and deeper integration, it hardly means that the EU will become a global superpower with a unified sovereignty, ideology and geopolitical stance anytime soon.

Yevgeny Bazhanov is vice chancellor of research and international relations at the Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy in Moscow.