Cold War Military Doctrine

On Friday, Moscow released the long-awaited new version of its military doctrine. Once again, we have been reminded that Russia’s greatest threats come from the West.  

According to the doctrine, the existing global security structure, which is dominated by NATO, does not ensure the “equal security” of all nations. NATO, along with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, are all “Cold War vestiges,” we are told, and should be replaced by Moscow’s formula for a new security architecture — a pan-European treaty that is supposed to prevent the use of force by individual nations or alliances. It would be interesting to throw this concept back to the Kremlin: How would it apply to Russia’s use of force in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia proper in the August 2008 five-day war? And if Russia places a priority on international law and institutions, why did it veto the prolongation of the United Nations and OSCE missions in the Georgian separatist regions, and why does it not allow EU observers to enter these regions?

The other danger noted in the doctrine is NATO expansion closer to Russia’s borders. This refers to U.S. missile defense projects and military bases in Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, as well as possible NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine (although the latter is a nonissue now that Viktor Yanukovych has been elected president of Ukraine). But why does the Kremlin not recognize the right of self-determination of nations like Georgia — their sovereign right to align themselves with any international organizations that they choose? Russia’s self-proclaimed “sphere of privileged interests” in the former Soviet republics does not give the Kremlin the right to decide what alliances these independent countries can join.

In October, Security Council head Nikolai Patrushev spoke about Russia’s right to initiate a nuclear first strike in regional or even local battles. Patrushev’s remark evoked sharp criticism in the West, but this first-strike provision was not found in the military doctrine posted on the Kremlin web site. It is expected that the first-strike doctrine will be included in the Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020, which has not been released to the public.

Another self-defense measure is Russia’s right to send troops abroad to protect its “national interests or its citizens.” The use of military force to protect Russian minorities is tricky business. In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin created these “minorities” by issuing Russian passports on a mass scale to South Ossetians and Abkhaz. There are significant Russian minorities in several former Soviet republics, and they could, in theory, fall under Moscow’s proclaimed right to protect its “national interests or its citizens.”

Considering the West to be Russia’s primary security threat is a throwback to Cold War thinking. This runs counter to U.S. President Barack Obama’s entire “reset” policy. But to be fair, the West is also to blame. One example is when the West recognized the independence of Kosovo. This gave Russia a perfect justification for recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

How should the West respond to Russia’s military doctrine? On one hand, it should be clear that it is against Russia’s unjustified and dangerous polemicizing of relations with the West. On the other hand, the West needs to more actively seek cooperation with Russia. Isolating Moscow will only lead to Russia’s radicalization and push it to align with pariah states and radical movements. Increased military and civilian engagement can help defuse the antagonism between Russia and the West. An increase in exchange programs among students and military cadets can help build trust and encourage mutual confidence. An increase in military cooperation against piracy, terrorism and cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan will also help build trust.

If both sides engage in these trust-building measures, there is a good chance that the next Russian military doctrine will finally eliminate its standard phrase that the West is the Kremlin’s greatest security threat.

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas is a senior research fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. His book “Russia’s Foreign Security Policy of Putin, Medvedev and Beyond” will be published in April.