An ABM Olive Branch

The interrelated objectives of reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, deploying limited national missile defense against rogue states, and preserving the viability of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty may be within reach. President Bill Clinton's decision to seek Russian agreement to incremental modification of the ABM Treaty, in exchange for reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals to levels suggested by Russia - perhaps as low as 1,500 or even 1,000 deployed warheads - rather than a massive overhaul of the treaty, may allow the two sides to reach an agreement that enhances the security of both nations. With high-level exchanges continuing, Russia and the United States appear to be progressing toward a compromise agreement.


The ABM Treaty, which prohibits the deployment by Russia and the United States of national or regional defenses against strategic missiles, has been referred to by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Clinton as the "cornerstone of strategic stability." During the Cold War, the treaty permitted the superpowers to reach agreement on strategic nuclear forces by removing the need to expand offensive forces designed to overwhelm growing missile defense capabilities. In this manner, the ABM Treaty made possible the SALT limitations on and START reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. This offense/defense link remains critical today, evidenced by the recent statement by Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev that U.S. unilateral deployment of national missile defense systems would do "unacceptable damage to the reduction of strategic offensive weapons."


A number of factors, including perceived U.S. movement toward unilateral NMD deployment, have strained U.S.-Russian relations in recent months. While the United States is ostensibly seeking a "thin" defense designed to protect against missiles threats from states such as North Korea, the perception among many Russians is that U.S. intentions toward Russia are hostile and that U.S. missile defenses are not for counterproliferation purposes, but rather an element of a well-orchestrated plan to undermine Russian security.


To maintain strategic stability in the face of a unilateral U.S. deployment, Russia would likely enhance its capabilities to overcome and penetrate defenses by accelerating the development and deployment of MIRVed "Topol M" missiles and postponing the elimination of all SS-18s (which carry 10 warheads), both inconsistent with the unratified START II Treaty. For this reason, U.S. NMD deployment, absent some kind of agreement with Russia, could be dangerous, with the potential for renewing the strategic arms race.


Rather than encouraging such destabilizing developments to occur, we believe that it is important to preserve the viability of both the ABM Treaty and the START process. If deployment by the United States of a limited national missile defense is necessary, any damage to arms limitations and non-proliferation that could be caused by such a deployment could be minimized by cooperatively developing limited NMD systems with Russia. For a variety of reasons, a cooperative NMD development, coupled with START III reductions to below START II levels, could be acceptable to both sides. This level could be as low as 1,500, as was proposed by Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov in August, or 1,000, as was suggested earlier by Yeltsin.


Such cooperation would help to alleviate suspicions in Russia regarding the intended target of a unilateral U.S. NMD deployment, enable the pursuit of strategic reductions, and likely promote transparency between the United States and Russia, which is important to strategic force reductions.


Cooperative NMD development is compatible with and compliments the Clinton administration's new incremental strategy. The initial changes it proposed to authorize 100 ABM interceptors deployed in Alaska would not reduce the effectiveness of the treaty, since it would hold the allowed number of ABM interceptors to the current level of 100. If accepted by Moscow, it would simply move the single U.S. site, which is presently inactive, from Grand Forks, North Dakota, to Alaska. We suggest that the minimal changes to the ABM Treaty necessary to accomplish this should be complimented by various cooperative measures, such as lab-to-lab and other scientific or technological exchanges, sharing of information related to NMD development, observations of missile interceptor tests, and the coordination of deployments in their discussions. If accepted, these measures would be inexpensive, would enhance the effectiveness of U.S. and Russian defenses and would promote mutual confidence on a broader scale.


Reducing nuclear arsenals is the most vital strategic interest of the United States and Russia, but will undoubtedly prove unattainable if the United States unilaterally deploys NMD systems. Cooperative deployment of missile defenses with the modest incremental amendment of the ABM Treaty proposed by the Clinton administration could serve as a mutually acceptable middle ground, thus allowing nuclear arsenals to be significantly reduced. Not only could this approach enhance the security of the United States and Russia, it is a necessary part of the strategy to ensure the continued effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.


Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., special representative of the president for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament from 1994 to 1997, is the president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS). John B. Rhinelander, legal adviser to the U.S. SALT I delegation that negotiated the ABM Treaty, is a vice chairman of LAWS. Alexander S. Yereskovsky is a former distinguished career officer in the Soviet and Russian Foreign Ministry who had important responsibilities, among other things, in the field of strategic defense. They contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.